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WARD S. BOWMAN, JRt
IN antitrust law, the conclusion that tying the sale of a second product to a
patented product is automatically illegal has been accepted by courts .for forty
years.' Under this theory, tying is harmful because it creates a new monopoly
wholly outside the patent. Conditioning the sale or lease of one commodity on
the sale or lease of another, a practice known as a tying agreement or a tie-in,
is generally considered a trade-restraining device. The recent Report of the
Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws declares that the
purpose of a tying contract is monopolistic exploitation.2 This exploitation is
achieved by "artificially extending the market for the 'tied' product beyond the
consumer acceptance it would rate if competing independently on its merits and
on equal terms." 3 The view that tying contracts allow the wielding of monop-
olistic leverage is widely accepted.
"Wielding monopolistic leverage" is an ambiguous phrase. A distinction can
usefully be made between leverage as a revenue-maximizing device and lever-
age as a monopoly-creating device. The first involves the use of existing power.
The second requires the addition of new power.4 In both cases monopoly is
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This Article attempts to explore the relationship between product complementarity and
tying sales as contrasted with other explanations which have been offered. A "comple-
mentarity" view of tying sharply contrasts with other positions in terms of what is called
the "leverage" problem. In particular, two explanations have been formulated by Professor
Aaron Director-tying as an evasion of price regulation and tying as a counting device for
price discrimination. I have reconstructed these explanations as I understood them from
previous discussions with him over a period of years ending in 1956 at the University of
Chicago Law School. Professor Director, of course, bears no responsibility for my inter-
pretation; my debt to him is great, however, not only for encouraging my interest in the
tie-in problem but more basically for providing both a theory and an application of the
"evasion" and the "counting" cases, reproduced here The conclusions contained in this
Article derive from comparison of these examples with the "complementarity" example to
determine whether or not tie-ins create new monopoly.
The relationship between product complements and the use of the tying device was de-
veloped jointly with John S. McGee, Associate Professor in the School of Business at the
University of Chicago. He has been a substantial contributor to the analysis in this Article;
in addition he has read and criticized the manuscript in several drafts.
1. The rule was established in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917). See text at note 35 infra.
2. REPoRT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CommriITE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 145 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'Y GEN. REP.).
3. Ibid.
4. A similar distinction can be made in the field of price discrimination. Thus price
discrimination may be used to increase revenue or to drive out competitors. The Robinson-
Patman Act, for example, embodies the assumption that cutting the price of a product in
a discriminatory manner is a means of driving out competitors and creating monopoly,
whereas the economic analysis stresses its usefulness in maximizing monopoly revenue.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
involved and the buyers of the first product have a second product forced upon
them. But if the tying sale is only a means of utilizing effectively a power al-
ready possessed, different conclusions may well be reached about the propriety
of the practice than if the tie-in created a second monopoly beyond the scope
of the first. The term "leverage," in this article, specifically describes the estab-
lishment of a new or second monopoly. The existence of such leverage depends
upon the effect of the tying arrangement on the output of the tied product. If
the tying seller is maximizing his return on the tying product and the same
output of the tied product can still be produced under circumstances consistent
with competitive production of the tied product, no additional or new monopoly
effect should be assumed.5 Conversely, if the amount of production of the tied
product is less than any output which could exist when the return on the first
product can be maximized, a monopoly in the tied product has been created.
The description of this effect as leverage derives from the economic concept of
monopoly as the equivalent of control over supply. A finding that supply is not
restricted is a finding that no monopoly has been created.
Analysis of the situations in which sellers find tie-ins useful casts doubt upon
the validity of the statement that the only purpose of tie-ins is monopolistic
exploitation. Present legal methods of treating tying contracts are based upon
a false notion of leverage. When the suggested definition of leverage is em-
ployed, analysis reveals the need for critical revaluation of the law in this area.
AN ANALYSIS OF TYING: FivE EXAMPLES
The Tie-in, a Monopoly Problem
To sell or lease one commodity, the tying product, advantageously on con-
dition that it be used with another commodity, the tied product, requires the
existence of monopoly power-in economic theory, the ability to control supply.
A competitive supplier, selling at the prevailing price and attempting to impose
a tie-in upon a buyer, would merely be displaced by a seller who did not.0 "It
is plain," Professor Watkins has pointed out, "that the sale or lease of one
article upon condition that a stipulated quantity or number of another article
or articles be bought or leased from the same concern imposes a handicap,
other things being equal, upon the distribution of the first article.... Under
freely competitive conditions, therefore, the adoption of the policy of the tying
contract would tend to hinder distribution of one product as much as it fostered
The usefulness of discrimination as a monopoly-creating device is dubious. See McGee,
Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U.
CHi. L. REv. 398, 399 n.3 (1956).
5. Monopoly is commonly described as the power to set a price. Where the sale of
only one product is involved, the definition is satisfactory because price and output are in-
versely related. To change the price is to change the output. With a tie-in, however, under
certain circumstances a supplier may raise the price of the tied product and lower the price
of the tying product without affecting the output of the former. Consequently supply re-
striction on the tied product must be emphasized here.
6. If the tying seller gave a compensating advantage to the buyer, he might not be
displaced. But in that event the tie-in would no longer be useful.
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distribution of the other or 'tied' product. There could be no advantage in the
employment of such a policy .... 
The idea of a compensating disadvantage advanced by Professor Watkins
is not unique to free competition. It might equally well be applied to a mo-
nopoly situation. A monopolist cannot necessarily improve his position-in-
crease his monopoly revenue-by imposing restrictions on his customers. A
monopolist who is charging a price which maximizes his return under given
demand and cost conditions is still confronted by the problem of imposing an
additional restriction on his customers-the equivalent of a higher price-with-
out giving up as much as he gains. To put the problem in this form is to em-
phasize the central prerequisite for a successful tie-in: what is sacrificed in the
way of return from the sale or lease of the tying product must be more-than
compensated by increased return from the tied product.8 Four different situa-
tions may be suggested in which tying might give rise to an increased return.
These include evasion of price regulation; single product discrimination, a
counting device; product complementarity in a variable proportion context;
and technological interdependence, a questionable case. A fifth example is also
discussed, which appears to involve a tie-in but is to be explained by economies
of joint production or sale.
Evasion of Price Regulation
Whenever two products are used together in fixed proportions, such as one
bolt and one nut, a cup and a saucer, or a left shoe and a right shoe, from the
buyer's point of view the two together might as well be a single product. The
price of the combination is the only matter of interest. Certainly the buyer of
a fifteen dollar pair of shoes does not care when he is told that the left shoe
costs ten dollars and the right one only five. Furthermore, a monopolist who
sold one part of such a combination while the other part was sold competitively
could exact as much monopoly revenue from the sale of one part as from the
sale of both. Here is a monopoly case-more precisely a nondiscriminating
monopoly case-comparable to that described by Professor Watkins in the
area of free competition-an illustration of compensating disadvantage. For
example, if the price of bolts were set by a monopolist and the price of nuts
were set by competition, tying the sale of nuts to the sale of bolts would not
increase the monopoly profit. Every increase in the price of nuts, even if the
monopolist could produce them as cheaply as competitors, would require re-
duction in the price of bolts by a compensating amount. If the monopolist
acted otherwise, he would be creating a situation which reduced his total mo-
nopoly return.0
7. xVATrINS, PUBLIc REGULATION OF CoMP zlnv PRACTICES IN BusINEss ENTER-
PRiSE 220-21 (3d ed. 1940).
8. The right to buy a product from whom one chooses and the availability of alter-
native sources of supply is a consideration in the purchase when no tie-in is present. There-
fore the demand for the tying product at any price will be less than the demand before the
imposition of the tie-in. The effect of the tie-in must more than compensate this loss.
9. This conclusion follows when one and only one price for the combination of one bolt
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If the assumption that the bolt monopolist is free to set the bolt price at the
level maximizing his return is abandoned-if, for example, the government
were to place a ceiling on the price of bolts and leave the price of nuts uncon-
trolled-a tying arrangement would become beneficial. By this means, the seller
could increase the nut price to maintain the profit-maximizing price for the bolt-
nut combination. Only when freedom to set the price of the monopolized prod-
uct is denied can a tie-in of two products used in fixed proportions become
useful.' This principle, however, does not limit the evasionary use of a tie-in
to the fixed proportion case alone. Wartime whiskey purchasers, for example,
and one nut can be set. Then setting the price of one component will maximize monopoly
'profit. Thus, if cost of producing a bolt or a nut is one cent-two cents for both-and the
demand for the combination is as shown in the following tables, the maximizing price for
the nut-bolt combination can be demonstrated.
If a monopoly in both products is assumed:
Price of one nut Demand for one Revenue Cost Total
and one bolt nut and oiw bolt profit
$.06 1000 $ 60.00 $ 20.00 $40.00
.05 2000 100.00 40.00 60.00
.04 3000 120.00 60.00 60.00
.03 4000 120.00 80.00 40.00
.02 5000 100.00 100.00 0
The following table shows that equally large profit can be made merely by fixing the
bolt price if nuts are competitively sold:
Bolt price when Bolt demand Bolt Bolt Bolt
nats sell for (Outs 1 cent) revenue cost profit
1 cent
$.05 1000 $50.00 $10.00 $40.00
.04 2000 80.00 20.00 60.00
.03 3000 90.00 30.00 60.00
.02 4000 80.00 40.00 40.00
.01 5000 50.00 50.00 0
Thus in this fixed proportion situation, a monopoly of bolts if nuts are competitive is as
good as a monopoly of nuts and bolts. If nuts are not competitive, the bolt monopolist has
an interest in making them so, but no tie-in is required to achieve a lower price for nuts.
10. An example may be found in the facts of FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). See
Stevens, Tying Arrangements, in CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATrOR-
NEY GENERAL'S COiVTrEE REPORT 145-47 (1955). In Stevens' summary: "[T] he respondent
was a jobber who sold most of the steel ties used for wrapping cotton bales (six ties were
required for each six yards of bagging), and also jute bagging used in connection with the
ties. These ties (for a limited period) were sold by the respondent only on condition that
the jute bagging for the cotton bales would also be purchased from it." Gratz, selling to
customers requiring cotton ties and bagging in fixed proportion, apparently found the Car-
negie Steel policy of low steel prices in wartime could be circumvented by charging for
bagging, through a tie-in, what could have been exacted from steel tie's had he been free
to raise that price. Stevens indicates that it was the "shortage" of steel which enabled the
respondents "to make hay with the jute bagging." But the shortage Was not the factor
which made this tie-in useful. Inability to raise the price of the steel ties caused the seller
to search for another method of maximizing return.
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bought unregulated rum and wine in order to secure price-controlled whiskey.
The sellers were thus able to employ tie-ins advantageously even though
whiskey and rum need not be used in fixed proportions.
Where fixed proportions are involved, no revenue can be derived from set-
ting a higher price for the tied product which could not have been made by set-
ting the optimum price for the tying product. The imposition of a tie-in under
these circumstances determines the identity of the seller, but the amount of the
tied product actually sold will not differ at all from that which could be sold if
the optimum price for the tying product were set." Another monopoly is not
created. The seller has only established a new method of exercising his already
existing monopoly in the regulated product. Leverage, therefore, does not exist
when the proportions of the two products are fixed.
Single Product Discrimination-A Counting Device
A similar conclusion follows when different buyers use different quantities of
the second commodity with one unit of the first. If the first commodity is worth
more to the intensive users than to the less intensive users-in economic terms,
if the formers' demand is less elastic-tying the second commodity to the first
can in effect achieve the goal of discriminatory pricing for the first.' 2 In this
situation, the tied product serves as a counting device to measure how inten-
sively the first product is being used.' 3
An illustration may perhaps be drawn from an early tying case.14 A machine
was invented for stapling buttons to high-button shoes, an operation formerly
done by hand at higher cost. The patentee had a number of prospective cus-
tomers for his machine, some of whom made a great many shoes, others only a
few. The invention saved each user a fixed amount on each button attached.
Thus the machine was worth more to the more intensive users. If the patentee
attempted to sell it at different prices to the different users, however, he would
have encountered two problems. To determine in advance how intensively each
buyer would use the machine would have been difficult; to prevent those who
paid a low price from reselling to those who paid a high price might have
proved impossible. A tie-in would resolve these difficulties. The machine might
be sold at cost, on condition that the unpatented staples used in the machine
be bought from the patentee. Through staple sales, the patentee could obtain
11. Critics of the Robinson-Patman Act make the same point when they suggest that
harm to competitors, caused by discrimination, is not to be confused with harm to com-
petition.
12. This effect is recognized by most texts on monopoly pricing. See, e.g., STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF Paice 214-18 (rev. ed. 1952). Stigler lists three essential conditions for
discrimination: first, the markets must be separable; second, since discrimination is point-
less when elasticities of demand are the same or nearly the same, demands in the separable
markets must be considerably different; and third, the cost of separating, or keeping the
markets separate, must not be too large. Id. at 215.
13. See Director & Levi, Law and the Future; Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. lZv.
281, 291-92 (1.956).
14. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 65 Fed. 619
(C.C.W.D. Mich. 1895).
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a device for measuring the intensity with which his customers used the ma-
chines. Hence by charging a higher than competitive price for the staples, the
patentee could receive the equivalent of a royalty from his patented machines.'r
Although a tying sale may thus be used as a "counting device" for setting
discriminatory prices on the tying product, the patentee creates no new and
additional monopoly over the tied product. He could have achieved exactly the
same return by attaching a meter to the button-stapling machine to measure
the intensity of use, leasing the machine and charging a meter rate.', As in the
first example, tying is used simply as a means of insuring the full monopoly
return on the tying product, where a monopoly already existed. No leverage
can be found because the output of tied product, staples, is exactly the same
when machine payment is charged directly and staples are sold competitively
as when the staples are tied to the machine. The two outputs under the two
equivalent methods of discrimination are identical.
Although the use of a tie-in sale as a counting device is consistent with the
facts of a large number of tying cases-for example, the tying of ink to mimeo-
graphs, punch cards to computors or rivets to riveting guns-it does not pro-
vide the only rational explanation of tying practice when variable proportions
are involved. The example suggests a means by which a monopolist can sep-
arate markets to achieve the maximum return from each of the various mar-
kets in which the single product can be sold. In this instance, the higher price
charged for the tied product is in lieu of the proper pricing of the tying product
without the tie-ins. But the fact that profit maximization on only a single
product is involved must be emphasized. The example takes no account of the
possible effect that the price or the quantity sold of the tying product may have
on the sales of the tied product, or of the effect that the price or the quantity
sold of the tied product may have on the sales of the tying product when the
demands for the two are related. 7
15. The same "discrimination" result could conceivably have been achieved by giving
the machine away and charging a still higher price for staples, except for the fact that the
machine might be provided to infrequent users. Under these circumstances the patentee
might not even secure a return which would cover the cost of supplying the machine. See
text at note 59 infra.
16. Although each user of a patented button-fastening machine pays the same rate per
pair of shoes manufactured, use of the tying device or of a meter has the effect of a dif-
ferent sales price for the machine according to intensity of use. This is discrimination,
since the large user pays the higher price. When the desired result is to charge the less
intensive user the higher price, the tie-in is ineffective. Whether or not the machine manu-
facturer's royalty comes from the sale or lease of the machine or from the sale of the
staples or the buttons, the maximum that can be charged is fixed by the amount the machine
saves the machine users. If the users to whom the machine is "worth" more can be charged
more for the machine, either in the form of a machine charge or indirectly by compulsory
purchase of a tied product, the patentee is being rewarded for his machine patent. Interest-
ingly enough, Mr. Justice Lurton used almost precisely this reasoning in deciding both
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir.
1896), and Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
17. Maximization of profit for one product when demands are related requires an
assumption about the price or output of the other, and the joint maximization from the
[Vol. 67:19
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Product Coiplenzentarity in a Variable Proportion Context
If two products complement each other, so that an increase in the price of
one will not only result in fewer sales of that product but also in fewer sales of
the other, the price which maximizes return from the sale of one will depend
upon the price at which the other sells. If product A, for which no close sub-
stitutes exist, is sold by only one seller, and product B, its complement, is
offered by many competing sellers, the maximum monopoly profit from the
sale of A, arising from the "best" price of A when B is competitively priced,
may possibly be increased by tying the sale of B to the sale of A. Increase of
the total profit will depend upon the existence of a situation-unlike the first
example-in which the profit lost on sales of product A by imposition of the
tie-in is more than compensated by the profit obtained from the higher price
charged for product B. This condition alone is the generalization which ex-
plains the rational use of any tie-in. When cross-elasticity of demand is in-
volved, a price increase in one product affects the demand for the other. Thus
in the first example, the price of left shoes will influence the demand for right
shoes and the price of right shoes will affect the demand for left shoes in the
same manner. On the other hand, when two complements are used in variable
proportions, even after the market has been separated into segments in which
different prices can be charged-the counting device-the cross-elasticity of the
complements creates the condition calling for two distinct prices in order to
maximize profit, just as if a single firm had the monopoly of each product.
When product complementarity is involved, the higher price charged for prod-
uct B is not a substituted means of charging for product A. On the contrary,
output of product B for use with product A is less than any output of product B
for such use which would exist by manipulation of the price or output of product
A when product B is competitive. In other words, the result of the tie-in is to
create the equivalent of another monopoly, a monopoly over product B for use
with product A. The tie-in thus yields the equivalent of monopoly by a single
seller over both A and B.18 Leverage is present; and the tie-in provides the
sale of both calls for setting the price of each. The geometric solution of such a two-
monopoly case is set forth in detail, although not related to the tie-in problem, in Bailey,
Price and Output Deteriniation by a Firm Selling Related Products, 44 Am. EcoN. REV.
82 (1954). See also ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTs 350 (1949).
18. The distinction between this example and the foregoing "counting" example re-
solves itself into this question: does a monopoly over the tied product, or part of it, add
any profit over what could be achieved by manipulating the price of the tying product, in
absence of control over the tied product. If two products have interrelated demands-
either substitutes or complements-a seller can realize more aggregate profit from setting
the two prices together than by setting the two prices independently. Having both mo-
nopolies under one management can be better than having the monopoly of A when B is
competitive. See Bailey, supra note 17. When the demand interrelationship between two
products is complementary and the proportions of use between the products are inseparable
for purposes of discrimination, a tie-in allows the monopolist of the tying product to be-
come a monopolist of the tied product for all its uses which require the tying product. In
contrast, the counting case maximizes, when prices are set and complementarity exists,
only by transforming a variable proportion market into a number of separable fixed pro-
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leverage, since the price and output of one product will necessarily affect the
price and output of the other.19 Of the three examples given, only under these
portion markets. If, with the product complementarity, the tied product has no use except
with a patented tying product, then the tie-in can achieve a result which is indistinguish-
able from that which would exist had the patentee been granted a patent on both the tying
and the tied.
The following example has been constructed to illustrate the use of a tie-in to create a
second monopoly (leverage) :
Suppose that patented product A is a new product which is useful only with a second
unpatentable product which in turn is useful only with the first. Suppose further that either
product A, the patented product, or B, the unpatented product, costs $2.00 to produce no
matter how many are rhade. Now assume that product B will sell competitively at $2.00.
The following table gives demand conditions calling for a $4.00 price for A:
Price of Demand for A Total Total Profit
A when price of revelte cost
B is 82.00
$5.50 500 $2750 $1000 $1750
5.00 1000 5000 2000 3000
4.50 1500 6750 3000 3750
4.00 2000 8000 4000 4000 (maximum)
3.50 2500 8750 5000 3750
3.00 3000 9000 6000 3000
2.50 3500 8750 7000 1750
If the complementary relationship between A and B is such that every $0.50 increase in
the price of B decreases by 100 the amount of A that may be sold, and that every $0.50 in-
crease in the price of A decreases by 200 the amount of B that can be sold, then the two
discrete monopoly prices which maximize returns for both products (assuming only one
nondiscriminatory price for each can be set) can be calculated once the demand for B at a
particular A ,price is given. Assume, therefore, that when A is priced at $4.00 B demand
will be as follows:









At the competitive price of $2.00, 3700 of B product can be sold when product A is
priced at $4.00. Now the holder of the patent on product A, by insisting that none of his
A product will be sold except on the condition that all B product used with A will be pur-
chased from him, and by lowering the price of A to $3.50 and raising the price of B to
$3.50, can substantially increase his monopoly profit. Monopoly profit prior to the tie-in
was $4000.00, as indicated by the first table. Tying the sale of product B to product A and
selling each for $3.50 makes possible the sale of 2200 of A netting $3300.00 and 2400 of B
netting $3600.00 for a total profit of $6900.00 on both.
19. The tie-in here is only useful to the seller if the maximizing price of the tied
product is above its competitive price. If the "best" price for the tied product were lower
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circumstances does a tying sale create leverage.20 Thus, as the term is used
in this article, leverage did not exist in the counting case because the same
result could have been obtained by metering the first product with no control
over the second. In the complementarity case, however, control over the second
product, product B, is required even though latent power over product B may
be said to reside in product A for those uses of B with A. Here, in the comple-
mentarity case, control over B is essential to securing revenue whi;:h could not
be realized from A alone; and the tie-in creates the equivalent of a new monopoly
of B in addition to the monopoly of the complementary product A.
Even though product complementarity exists, a tie-in may not be feasible
despite the possibility of increased profits. A pen seller, for example, would
have difficulty conceiving of an arrangement assuring that only ink cartridges
of his own make were being used with his pen. After a pen sale, the cost of
policing the tie-in would be prohibitive. And leasing a ballpoint pen is hardly
to be recommended in the name of sound merchandising. But if, rather than
pens and cartridges, an example of two complementary machines is assumed,
and if for two maximizing sale prices equivalent lease rental charges are sub-
stituted, a tying arrangement will result in increased profits.21 The United Shoe
Machinery Company, for example, made extensive use of the practice of leas-
ing a monopolized or patented machine only on the condition that another
machine-either unpatented, unmonopolized or precariously monopolized-
would also be rented.22
Technological Interdependence
The usefulness of a particular product or device may depend not only upon
its own adaptability but equally upon the adaptability of some essential comple-
no tie-in would be needed. Consumers, presumably, would not have to be forced to pay
less than the going market price.
20. The tie-in as a counting device can be viewed as a means of stopping leakages be-
tween markets. Single product discrimination requires that the markets be separated. See
note 12 supra. In contrast, the solution in this example arises irrespective of leakage. Even if
perfect price discrimination on the tying product could be achieved without the use of a
tie-in, the tying mechanism could still be utilized to maximize return on the tied product
as well. This follows from indifference analysis concerning individual consumer behavior
in the presence of complementary goods. Thus, if the market for bacon and eggs consisted
of only one customer, his indifference or preference for various combinations of these two
products may be such that, given a bacon and egg budget, he would derive more satisfaction
from an expenditure in which bacon was sixty cents a pound and eggs thirty cents a dozen
then if each sold for forty-five cents. See HIcKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL 42-45 (1948) ; Hayek,
The Geometrical Representation of Complententarity, 10 RPv. OF EcoN. STUDIES 122 (1942-
43).
21. A machine and a product would provide an equally good example. The button-
fastening machine and the staples, used as an illustration of a counting device, might con-
ceivably involve interrelated demands as well. The two discrete prices could add some
monopoly in addition to the advantage achieved by counting.
22. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
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ment. If the essential complement did not conform to exact specifications, it
might impair the operation or usefulness of the principal product. For example,
if a very slight imperfection in an unpatented card were to make a patented
tabulating machine operate inefficiently, or in a more extreme case actually
cause costly damage, a patentee lessor or seller of such a machine would have
an understandable interest in protecting the good will which arises from satis-
factory performance. When the exact source of poor performance is difficult
to trace, the supplier will be especially concerned that no foreign elements are
being used with his machines. This defense for tying clauses has often been
raised in the litigated cases. Thus in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., defendant
claimed that ink supplied by others would or might impair the proper function-
ing of a mimeograph machine which he manufactured.2 3 Nor is the example of
cards and tabulators fanciful; such a defense was invoked in a tying case by
I.B.M.24 Again, in the early shoe machinery cases, the United Company
stressed the very close technological interdependence of a wide variety of
machines each of which, although doing a separate task, was only efficient if
properly co-ordinated with the others.25
In many cases involving technological interdependence, a careful description
of the specifications necessary for successful performance might overcome the
objections of the manufacturer. However, in one respect interdependence differs
from the other examples described: the interests of the prospective "tyer" and
the "tyee" are not in conflict. Each has a rational interest in technological efficien-
cy. One would rarely expect objections from a buyer or lessee that a comple-
mentary product is being forced upon him, if the technological reasons advanced
by the seller are valid.26 In the Pick case, General Motors insisted that its
dealers sell and install only those parts authorized by the company.27 The sub-
stance of the court's holding was that substandard parts installed in a General
Motors car by a General Motors dealer would have a deleterious effect on the
company's good will because users would not ordinarily associate the improper
functioning of their automobiles with the use of non-General Motors parts.
Why the dealers' interest in this problem should not parallel that of General
Motors was not discussed in the case. An absence of conflict of interest at least
would support a strong presumption that the difficulties arising from problems
of technological interdependence between products can be resolved by means
other than tying contracts.
23. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
24. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
25. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
26. When the supplier of a patented item is a strong, responsible and financially stable
company and the competitive suppliers of the complementary item have opposite charac-
teristics, the user of the complements is likely to express dissatisfaction with the results of
the combination to the stronger patentee. In this situation, withdrawal of a guarantee by
the patentee, unless acceptable complements are used, would seem to involve no more than
fair business practice, even though in effect the buyer becomes tied.
27. Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1.935).
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Economies of Joint Production or Sale
Occasionally tie-ins are alleged to exist under circumstances in which no ty-
ing is intended and in fact no tie-in, in any economic meaning of the word, can
be found. Probably no one has bought shoes without buying shoelaces at the
same time, and the sale of that combination of mechanical parts generally called
an automobile is not usually thought of as a tie-in. Of course, shoelaces may be
purchased separately, as may automobile parts, but this condition does not pre-
clude the possibility that a tie-in is involved. Still, when the cost of producing
and selling the combination is less than the cost of producing and selling the
parts separately, no tie-in can be said to exist. Cost justification excludes the
rational use of a tie-in. No coercion is required when a cost advantage exists,
for these lower costs will be reflected in lower prices.
That the separate offering of a complementary product does not preclude the
existence of a tie-in is apparent from an extreme example in which the con-
dition imposed on a buyer for not taking both products from the same seller
requires the alternative of paying a higher price for one product than for both.
In contrast is another extreme example. Suppose the publisher of both a morn-
ing and an evening newspaper found that the cost of running a want ad in both
papers was no higher than running it in one paper only. For this reason, the
publisher quoted the same price for running the ad in both papers as for run-
ning it in one, to the disadvantage of a competitor, the publisher of an after-
noon newspaper alone. The cost justification assumed in this example should
preclude a finding that a tie-in exists. 28 The larger publisher's finding that re-
setting the want ads in type for the afternoon paper was more expensive than
merely reprinting the morning's ads seems a reasonable basis for his course of
action-a case of economy of scale. If such an arrangement were to be struck
down, efficient operations would have to be sacrificed.
Use of tying sales is not necessarily conclusive proof that the seller is wield-
ing leverage. The analysis of the motives and purposes which may underlie
utilization of the tying device suggests that the legal conclusion of automatic
illegality is too facile. The device may be employed to achieve a number of
goals, some of which are dearly legitimate. Of the five examples discussed,
only one, that of product complementarity in the variable proportion context
described, involves leverage.
LEVERAGE AND THE LAW
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, contains the only specific statutory lan-
guage forbidding tie-ins.29 In section three of this act, prohibition of tie-ins ex-
28. No necessary relationship to the facts of Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), should be assumed. If a cost justification had been present in
that case, defendants would almost certainly have brought it to the Court's attention.
29. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952). Section 3 of the act forbids any
person "to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, ma-
chinery, supplies or other comm6dities, whether patented or unpatented ... or fix a price
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tends to both patented and unpatented products, covers both selling and leas-
ing, but is limited to commodities. The tie-in, to be found illegal, must be likely
"to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 0 The sec-
tion contains no direct reference to leverage, but in a very real sense the con-
ception of the whole Clayton Act depends upon the leverage notion.3' The
declared purpose of the sponsors of this legislation was to strengthen the anti-
trust laws by outlawing particular practices. These practices, beyond the reach
of the Sherman Act, were believed to lead to or "ripen into" monopoly. Among
such practices, tying arrangements were emphasized. The very language "sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" reflects the leverage
presumption.
The relationship of tying to the creation of monopoly-the leverage problem
-had been faced by courts in the area of patent law before the passage of the
Clayton Act. In the Button-Fastener case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit considered a patentee's right to sell a patented machine for stapling
buttons to shoes with the attached condition that staples be purchased from the
patentee.3 2 The court decided the issue in favor of the patentee. However the
tie-in question was not presented to the Supreme Court until 1912, sixteen
years later. In a four to three decision Mr. Justice Lurton, who had decided
the earlier Button-Fastener case, came to the same result when considering the
tying sales of a mimeograph machine on condition that ink, stencils, paper and
other supplies be bought from the patentee.33 A vigorous dissent was entered
by Mr. Justice White. Stripped to its essential logic, the dissent advanced the
proposition that a tie-in to a patented commodity was the equivalent of allow-
ing a monopoly over the tied product.34 This additional monopoly, White rea-
soned, went beyond that granted to the patentee and should not be protected
by the patent law.
This "patent extension" argument of the minority became the majority
opinion five years later in the Motion Picture Patents case.35 Mr. Justice
Clarke's opinion makes an unmistakable reference to leverage:
charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on condition, agreement
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or
such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
30. Ibid.
31. See Arr'y GEN. REP. 129.
32. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th
Cir. 1896).
33. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
34. "[T]hat which was not embraced by the patent, which could not have been em-
braced therein and which if mistakenly allowed and included in an express claim would
have been inefficacious, is now by the effect of a contract held to be embraced by the
patent and covered by the patent law." Id. at 51.
35. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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"Such a restriction is invalid because such a film is obviously not any part
of the invention of the patent in suit; because it is an attempt, without
statutory warrant, to continue the patent monopoly in this particular char-
acter of film after it has expired, and because to enforce it would be to
create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films,
wholly outside of the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have inter-
preted it."3 6
This legal conclusion relating to patent tie-ins has remained substantially un-
changed for forty years. When the sale or lease of a commodity is tied to a
patented product, the tie-in is considered per se illegal.37 No exceptions to the
rule have emerged since its establishment; and indeed its acceptance may be
gauged by the fact that no defendant has even questioned the doctrine in recent
years.
38
The attitude of the law toward tying to unpatented products, covered by
section three of the Clayton Act, is not so clear. Although the per se rule has no
application here, a recent summary of the law by the Supreme Court in the
Times-Picayune case does profess to narrow the area for relevant inquiry.39
According to this opinion, a court may find illegal activity, in the absence of a
patent on the tying product, whenever the supplier enjoys a monopolistic posi-
tion in the tying product or if a substantial volume of commerce in the tied
product is restrained. 40 For purposes of economic analysis this "clarification"
is not helpful. A tie-in is a useless device unless the supplier possesses sub-
tantial monopoly over the tying product. How much economic monopoly must
exist before the law's monopoly, which will result in illegality, may be found?
In determining whether a substantial volume of the tied product is restrained,
should a lower court emphasize "substantial" or "restrained"? If the former,
the equivalent of the "quantitative substantiality test" of the Standard Oil
Company case suggests itself.41 If the latter, application of the kind of criteria
embodied in an economic description of leverage seems proper. These questions
must be answered if the advice about tie-in law in the absence of patents given in
Times-Picayune is to be of use. To attempt to provide answers to these
broader problems, however, is beyond the scope of an article concerned with
leverage.
36. Id. at 518.
37. The rule of per se illegality operates only if the volume of the tied supplies is
"significant." See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). Sale
of the patented machine was involved in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Subsequently, in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32 (1918), a machine lease was distinguished and the tie-in allowed under patent
law. In a later case brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act and involving the same
facts, the result was reversed. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S.
451 (1922).
The term "patented product" includes a machine, a process or a combination as well as
a commodity.
38. As a measure of the doctrine's present accepted status, see Arr'Y GEN. REP. 145.
39. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
40. Id. at 608.
41. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See AT'Y GEN. REP. 141.
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Leverage necessarily involves the creation of new monopoly. Only when the
original monopoly can be assumed to serve some useful public purpose, as in a
patent situation, need the relevance of the leverage question arise. If the first
monopoly is without conceivable justification, the creation of a second is irrele-
vant to the public interest. Either the justifications for the first monopoly
should be attacked directly, or, if the first is an acceptable monopoly, the effect
of tying should be scrutinized to determine whether it leads to the establish-
ment of an unacceptable second. The following evaluation is confined to the
leverage problem as it relates to an acceptable first monopoly, here exemplified
by the existence of the patent.
EVALUATION OF PATENT TIE-IN LAW IN TERMS OF LEVERAGE
Writing a fifth and concluding part of a long article on patent practice and
the antitrust laws in 1942, Mr. Giles Rich summarized what a patentee may
legitimately do in exercising his right to exclude others from making, vending
or using his invention.42 The patentee has the right to maximize the monopoly
profit from the invention. He can sell or not sell, lease or not lease. He can
restrict production or fix the price of his own sales or the sales of his licen-
sees.43 What a patentee may do involves "restraining trade and maintaining a
monopoly, but permission to do so with respect to inventions is the basis of the
patent system. This is the reward offered to induce invention, disclosure and
enterprise." 44 Mr. Rich then provides several examples of licensing which are
clearly permissible because they make possible only a more profitable exploita-
tion of the proper patent monopoly. Examples of permissible practice include
the retention or reservation by a patentee of a particular field of use for him-
self or for others; a reservation of this kind is allowed even though the other
fields of use have been licensed to someone else. Such division of fields is per-
missible because it has not "created a monopoly in anything more than the
patented invention. '45 A reservation or a division of geographical areas leads
Mr. Rich to exactly the same result. "Nothing has been added to the patent
monopoly."46 A similar conclusion is also reached about restrictions upon a
licensee's output. "He has not enlarged his monopoly nor has he extended it
to anything other than the invention protected by the patent. '47 Summarizing
his conclusions, Mr. Rich cites with approval the Motion Picture Patents case
to the effect that a patentee's monopoly cannot be expanded beyond the boun-
daries claimed:
"The test is always the same: will the enforcement of the restriction be a
mere enforcement of the right to exclude others from making, using, or
42. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 422 (1942).
43. Id. at 424.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 425.
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 426. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 67 :19
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
selling the patented invention or will it enlarge the rights of the patentee
as against the public? If to enforce it gives a partial monopoly in
an unpatented commodity, there has been an extension. '48
This test which Mr. Rich applies is the equivalent of the question posed in
this Article: is leverage involved? Mr. Rich then goes on to conclude, without
proof, that tie-ins inevitably involve monopoly over a second product. One
need not disagree with any of Mr. Rich's conclusions to hold the position that
if a patent tie-in can be found which does not involve leverage, it cannot be
ruled illegal by the logic of the leading cases. The finding that leverage exists
has been the central determinant to a reasoned conclusion that patent tie-ins
should not be allowed.
Although a rule holding illegal the sale or lease of a patented product or
machine to which another product is tied is sometimes supported on the ground
that the wisdom of a public policy sponsoring any patent monopoly is doubt-
ful,49 such an argument is in effect a direct attack upon the first monopoly and
seems to be a better subject for separate inquiry. The validity of the original
monopoly is not questioned here.
Other arguments may be advanced to support the desirability of a per se rule
against patent tie-ins, whether or not leverage is present. One would justifiably
assert that non-leverage tie-ins foster either the evasion of price regulation, as
in the first example, or price discrimination, as in the second, the counting
case. A per se rule to stamp out all evasion of price regulation is unacceptable.
Given fixed proportions, tie-ins can be used to evade privately regulated as well
as publicly regulated prices. But gray markets may result in better allocation
of resources than would exist if the fixed prices were observed, 50 and, unlike
black markets, they are not publicly condemned. Moreover, in the combination
patent cases, products in fixed proportions cannot be sold without the use of
tie-ins; and the interest so protected seems valid.r1 To make a tie-in illegal in
the price discrimination situation is arbitrary, for it resolves a very complicated
problem in a manner totally different from the law directly concerned with
price discrimination. If a tie-in is declared automatically illegal because of dis-
crimination, the result is effective elimination of the necessary showing, re-
quired even by the Robinson-Patman Act, that "the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 52
Secondly, the contention that a tie-in prolongs the effective life of a patent rests
on a belief that entry will be less prompt after the expiration of a patent, when
a tie-in is used, because two entries, one into the field of the tying product and
48. Id. at 427. (Emphasis added.) See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
49. See Plant, Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Invention, 1 EcoNomIcA
(n.s.) 30 (1934).
50. See STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRicE 83-87 (rev. ed. 1952).
51. See text following note 54 infra.
52. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). See Ari'y GEN. REp. 160-67.
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another into the field of the tied, are then required. 53 The requisite "know-
how" is enlarged, the argument runs, and a longer life for the monopoly is thus
created. The argument has no validity when the tied product has other uses
than with the tying product, for the essential know-how is already in the mar-
ket. Moreover, to support the entry argument, the patentee himself must be
able to produce everything the market demands. If the patentee buys the tied
product from others, using the tie-in to become an exclusive seller of the tied
product, the other manufacturers will acquire the know-how. A per se rule
takes no account of this common pattern. Finally, know-how concerns the ty-
ing product as well as the tied. Once the patent on the tying product has ex-
pired, any relevant know-how must also be acquired by new producers of this
tying product. The tie-in will only delay entry, therefore, when the time re-
quired to obtain tying product know-how is shorter than that for the tied
product. Under any other circumstances, no time extension can be attributed
to the existence of a tie-in. But if the know-how for manufacture of the tied
product is actually longer, no reason may exist for the patentee to establish a tie-
in in the first place. The relationship of tie-ins to new entry seems far too doubt-
ful to justify per se treatment.
The legal rule which has developed has been based upon an imprecise
evaluation of the economic effects of tying practice in extending monopoly.
Analytically, the per se rule depends upon a prior finding of leverage. This
dependence suggests the relevance of a proposal which would not condemn
patent tie-ins when leverage clearly is not involved. No conclusive method can
be prescribed which will make possible a neat division of cases into two
mutually exclusive categories of "leverage" and "no leverage." A clearer under-
standing of what is involved in distinguishing the "counting" case and the
"complementarity" case might lead to the eventual establishment of a more
satisfactory and certainly a more logical legal rule.
Reason neither in law nor economics will justify concern over leverage
unless separate prices of both the tying and the tied products are set. Advan-
tageous use of leverage necessarily depends upon effective pricing of the first
and the second product. 5 The "one price" cases involving economies of joint
production or sale, therefore, might be segregated for exclusion not only from
the per se rule, but also from the "illegal" category. Courts now hold illegal
certain patent tie-in arrangements in which all the revenue is derived from the
sale of a single tied product. Most notable of this category are the familiar
combination patent cases, where no part of the combination is patentable and
no revenue can be derived without the sale of one of the component products.
In the absence of the tie-in, the seller can obtain no royalty from the otherwise
perfectly proper licensing of the combination. A number of illustrative cases
might be cited, cases in which a tie-in could not have a leverage effect. Among
53. For a fuller discussion of the double entry problem, see Bork, Vertical Integration
and the Sherman Act, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 157, 195 (1954).
54. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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them stand such well-known patent tie-in decisions as Carbice,55 Mercoid 56
and B. B. Chemical.57 These combination patent cases are special examples of
the "fixed proportion" type described in the first example. The absence of free-
dom to set the price of the monopolized product-in these cases, a process-
makes this ldnd of tie-in useful. 58 A patentee of a combination patent cannot
enjoin manufacture of the unpatented parts; he lacks any practical means to
control their assembly and sale at the retail level; hence, absent tying, he is
unable to exercise any freedom in setting the price of that which is monopolized.
A conclusion that leverage cannot exist if only one price is set is not a con-
clusion that leverage is involved when more than one price is set. Even when
a tie-in is used solely as a counting device, and no revenue from an additional
monopoly is involved-the second example-the price of the tying as well as
the tied product must be so fixed that the equivalent of a minimum charge to
protect against nonuse is created. One of the prices serves the sole purpose of
eliminating the undesirable customer in the extreme case. 59 Thus, the existence
of a charge for the tying product in addition to the charge for the tied product
does not necessarily signal the equivalence of another monopoly. For example,the
fact that in both A. B. Dick and Button-Fastener 60 the machines were sold at
cost and the staple price and the ink price were raised does not necessarily in-
dicate that two maximizing prices were set, with a resulting creation of lever-
age.
Factors given no attention in the opinions and illuminated only by ambiguous
evidence must be considered before determining whether such cases as Button-
Fastener, A. B. Dick, Motion Picture Patents or Shoe Machinery 61 are
"counting" cases or "complementarity" cases. Button-Fastener, for instance,
may be viewed more easily than A. B. Dick as a "counting" case involving no
leverage because only one counter, staples, was involved in the former, while
in the latter, the machine was tied to several other products: ink, stencils, paper
and other supplies. Any one of them presumably would have provided a per-
fectly adequate and satisfactory counting device; the counting example cannot
explain why all the products are tied. 62
A counting explanation of the tie-in of films to projectors in the Motion
Picture Patents case is even less convincing. Any movie house which is not
"dark" is using film, and the amount of film used is an unsatisfactory means of
55. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931.).
56. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
57. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
58. See text at note 10 supra.
59. This use of the second price has been suggested by Paul MacAvoy, a graduate stu-
dent in the Economics Department at Yale. His helpfulness in the preparation of this
Article deserves general acknowledgment as well.
60. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th
Cir. 1896).
61. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
62. This conclusion would seem to follow unless the multiple tie-in can be assumed to
represent the kind of carefulness involved in wearing both belt and suspenders.
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finding the exhibitor who should be paying the highest effective rate for the
use of a projection machine. Paid admissions would appear a better measure.
Although the record does not show that separate prices were set on the projec-
tion machine and the films to produce a return larger than could be received
from either, the case is consistent with this rationale, and the alternatives offered
are unsatisfactory. Similarly, the complicated Shoe Machinery case, while not
susceptible of an easy explanation, in certain aspects fits the analysis of com-
plementarity.
CoNCLUSION
A finding like that of the complementarity example has not been a legal pre-
requisite to a conclusion of illegality in tie-in cases. In both Motion Picture
Patents and Shoe Machinery, complementarity was not considered. The analysis
in this article suggests that the right result may have been reached for the wrong
reasons. Doubts must exist about such cases until the relevant information is
obtained by something more than pure accident. In the "one price" cases, how-
ever, no reasonable basis yet appears for conclusively identifying leverage with
tying and automatically declaring tie-ins illegal. At the least, analysis of the
patent combination cases suggests their exemption from the per se rule of
illegality. More generally, inquiry into the necessary effects of a patentee's
adoption of the tying device should be stressed in all patent cases. Outside the
patent field, inquiry might be first directed to the monopoly which enables
effective use of the tie-in mechanism. Should that monopoly prove consistent
with the public interest, examination could then be extended to considerations
properly governing patent tie-in cases.
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